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Introduction 
The fall 1999 protests over the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting 
in Seattle highlighted the intensifying social and political tensions accompanying 
the market-driven forces of "globalization." Neoliberal assumptions of "free 
trade" and "capital mobility" had previously dominated the political discourse of 
both developed and developing countries with grandiose promises of "rising 
tides" of prosperity "lifting the boats" of all participating social groups via higher 
wages, lower retail prices, and increasing employment. While neoliberal cri-
tiques (Rugman 1994; Hufbauer and Schott 1993, 1992; Lustig, Bosworth, and 
Lawrence 1992; Reich 1991) have tended to focus on recalcitrant nationalism 
such as protectionist trade policies and intransigent unions with inflexible labor 
policies, the reality is that supranational institutions like the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and the WTO are radically transforming existing "social 
structures of accumulation" (Gordon, Reich, and Edwards 1984) through exter-
nally imposed "structural adjustment" policies (cf. Otero 1996; Castaneda 1995; 
Perry 1994).l That is, the expanding boundaries of the post-Cold War "global 
factory" entail the abrupt dismantling of historically negotiated capital-labor 
relations under the guise of enhancing national living standards. Hence, the 
unique features of the class struggle in particular countries are overshadowed by 
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the representation of social conflict as inevitable squabbles over access to the 
global shopping mall; human rights and labor mobility are conspicuously absent 
from the discussion (Beckman 1997; Hansen-Kuhn 1997; Marshall 1993). From 
this perspective, then, the dominant discourse has effectively subsumed the 
historically specific politics of production into the universalistic culture of 
consumption. 
In the Western Hemisphere, the most debated economic globalization 
initiative of the post-Cold War epoch is the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). As one of the most expensive and intensive lobbying campaigns 
in U.S. legislative history, featuring unusually strong inter-corporate cohesion 
and political pressure on the American state (Dreiling 2000), NAFTA was 
implemented on January 1,1994, following its ratification by the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada; Central and South American countries are expected to be 
included in the next decade (Hansen-Kuhn 1997; Inter-American Development 
Bank 1996; Gestrin and Waverman 1994). Touted as a job creation program for 
the American economy, competitive relief for U.S. multinational corporations, 
and a booster-shot for the faltering Mexican economy, NAFTA was portrayed by 
the Bush and Clinton Administrations as a political catalyst for accelerating 
economic growth on both sides of the border. According to President Clinton, 
during a September 14, 1993, signing ceremony of NAFTA side agreements, 
[NAFTA] means an even more rapid closing of the gap 
between our two wage rates. And as the benefits of economic 
growth are spread in Mexico to working people . . . [t]heyTl 
have more disposable income to buy more American products 
and there will be less illegal immigration because more Mexi-
cans will be able to support their children by staying home. 
(1993[c], 1) 
On the other hand, opponents of "free trade" in the United States were 
chastised by government, business, and sympathetic think tanks as economic 
protectionists,2 even labeled as misinformed sympathizers of obstinate industrial 
unions, while the Mexican middle class was persuaded that American opposition 
was a continuation of Yankee domination whose primary goal was to perpetuate 
Mexico's economic underdevelopment.3 Mexican President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari often emphasized this nationalistic theme by declaring that the goal of 
NAFTA was "to export goods and not people." On September 21, 1993, at the 
quadrennial International Industrial Conference convened in San Francisco, 
President Salinas declared: 
It is trade that will provide us with the opportunities to produce 
more, to create more opportunities in Mexico. . . . [Those] 
Mexicans who come to the U.S. looking for jobs take 
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risks . . . and are very talented. That is why we want them in 
Mexico . . . so they will use their courage, ability and risk-
taking willingness for the development of Mexico and not the 
development of another country, (quoted in Johns 1993) 
Furthermore, implicit in this free trade doctrine are assumptions that modernizing 
the Mexican economy will increase jobs, raise wages, reduce consumer prices, 
elevate the Mexican standard of living, and reduce future flows of illegal 
immigration to the United States. 
In the United States, the issue of curbing illegal immigration was especially 
important in consolidating support among conservative politicians as well as 
nativist and restrictionist groups who later waged the California campaign for 
Proposition 187 (Calavita 1996). President Clinton underscored this point during 
an October 1993 town hall meeting in Sacramento, "One of the reasons that I so 
strongly support this North American Free Trade Agreement is, if you have more 
jobs on both sides of the border and incomes go up in Mexico, that will 
dramatically reduce the pressure felt by Mexican working people to come here for 
jobs. Most immigrants come here illegally not for the social services, most come 
here for the jobs" (1993[b], 1). 
This position was echoed one month later by U.S. Attorney General Janet 
Reno. She emphasized that NAFTA would enable the United States to regain 
control of its borders by reducing the flow of undocumented migrants, "[The] best 
chance to reduce illegal immigration is robust Mexican economic growth. That 
is why passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement will help me protect 
our borders. NAFTA will create jobs in both the U.S. and Mexico. The Mexican 
jobs will be filled by workers who might otherwise cross illegally into America. 
If NAFTA passes, my job guarding the border will be easier. If NAFTA fails, my 
job stopping the flow of illegal immigrants will become even more difficult" 
(1993, 7). 
This article examines the early performance of NAFTA as an important 
neoliberal program for promoting economic globalization. In particular, it 
assesses whether NAFTA has achieved its espoused goals of rapid job growth, 
higher wages, rising standard of living, geographic dispersal of foreign invest-
ment, and reduced emigration from Mexico. A key issue is whether NAFTA 
offers an effective framework for promoting bi-national economic integration 
that benefits the social and economic agendas of both countries. Or, is it a 
rhetorical wolf in sheep's clothing that advances earlier policies of U.S. industrial 
restructuring and labor market reorganization that primarily benefit the interests 
of American corporations over workers and consumers. That is, by fostering the 
mobility of capital and labor, is NAFTA a political catalyst for challenging 
historically negotiated "social structures of capital accumulation" that tradition-
ally define a society's acceptable "cultural rate-of-profit," work conditions, and 
living standards.4 Finally, the U.S. media has neglected the increasing economic 
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sacrifices of the Mexican middle and working classes that were not predicted after 
the implementation of NAFTA. This article explores the sources of these 
difficulties, the forces underlying the continued growth of Mexican immigration 
over at least the next two decades, and its increasing social and geographic 
diversification. 
The Demography of Migration: 
Aging into Employment and Retirement 
The demographic transition of the Mexican population—from a largely rural 
to an increasingly urban population—has been accompanied by lower fertility 
rates and smaller families. Both policy-makers and journalists have emphasized 
that this trend will invariably result in lower levels of emigration to the United 
States (Millman 2000; Commission on Immigration Reform 1997). Even so, 
there is a temporal lag in the impact of declining fertility rates on reducing the 
aggregate size of the potential emigrant population because of the youthful age 
structure of the Mexican population. For instance, over the last decade, the 
economically active Mexican population has risen from 31.4 million in 1990 to 
an estimated 41.6 million in 2000. Overall, an annual average of one million new 
workers entered the Mexican labor force each year during the 1990s. It is for this 
reason that the cornerstone of the North American Free Trade Agreement is the 
unfettered flow of commerce—particularly foreign investment—with its prom-
ise of accelerating the growth of jobs in Mexico. The key issue is whether 
NAFTA-induced strategies of economic "modernization" are narrowing the gap 
between the supply and demand for employment. If the Mexican economy is able 
to absorb a larger proportion of its newest workers, this could substantially reduce 
the pressure of migration to the United States—an explicit goal of NAFTA as 
asserted by President Clinton. 
Over the last three decades, the Mexican government has pursued an 
effective population stabilization policy, including a variety of family planning 
programs. During this period, the national population growth rate has declined 
from an annual increase of 3.1 percent in the 1960s to 1.9 percent in the 1990s and 
is projected at 1.5 percent over the next decade, 2000-2010 (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1999; Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 1996). According to demo-
graphic statistics reported in the Wall Street Journal, annual job growth will 
match labor force growth by 2006. However, this favorable forecast is based on 
questionable assumptions such as an average four percent Mexican GDP growth 
rate and the steady decline of new job entrants over the next decade—from 1.2 
million in 1996 to .8 million in 2007 (Millman 2000). In fact, it is doubtful that 
this demographic trend will significantly reduce the growth rate of the Mexican 
workforce for at least 20 years. This is because Mexico's youthful age structure, 
together with its rapidly expanding population base (from 68.7 million in 1980 to 
over 100 million in 2000), will continue to produce a substantially higher, 
absolute number of new workers over the next two decades. Not incidentally, this 
trend will include the increasing participation of women in the Mexican labor 
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force. The central issue is whether they will contribute to a rapidly expanding, 
diversified Mexican economy or expand the pool of potential immigrants to the 
United States. 
Table 1 presents the population distributions by gender for 1998 and 2010 
(U.S. Bureau of Census 1999; Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo 1996). The 
key 10-19 year-old age group numbers 21.85 million in 1998 and is estimated to 
rise to 23.65 million in 2010. If only 80 percent of this male cohort become active 
job seekers, then an average of nearly one million new male workers will enter 
the Mexican labor force each year over the second decade of the millennium. And, 
if only one-fourth of the women of this age cohort seek paid employment, then 
a total of at least 1.3 million new Mexican workers will be entering the job market 
each year during this period. This number, moreover, does not include underem-
ployed campesinos who will be displaced due to the "rationalization" of rural, 
communal landholding plots or ejidos. Moreover, it is important to note that 
average life expectancy is projected to rise from 71.6 years in 1998 to 75.5 years 
in 2010. This trend suggests that Mexican workers in the United States will have 
to continue to send remittances for a longer period of time to support elderly 
family members (and/or send additional household members to the United States) 
or bring them to the United States after they outlive their familial support 
networks in Mexico. Consequently, while Mexico has undergone a sharp decline 
in its aggregate fertility and population growth rates, the absolute number of 
Mexicans entering the workforce (especially women) will continue to increase 
over the next two decades. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Regional Economic Development 
or Intra-Sectoral Integration 
The demographic projections described above indicate that the supply of 
Mexican job seekers will exceed current levels through 2020. The central issue 
is the ability of the NAFTA-guided economy to absorb these future cohorts of 
workers. According to a recent report by the U.S.-Mexican Chamber of Com-
merce, 
As the second-largest market for U.S. goods and services, a 
growing, prosperous Mexico is in the interest of every citizen 
in the U.S. This trade lowers poverty in Mexico with a resulting 
reduction in illegal immigration. A vibrant Mexico will be 
better able to deal with corruption and illegal drug activities 
as well as provide resources for a healthier environment. 
(1998, 3) 
Ironically, as noted by analysts of conflicting political perspectives (Beckman 
1997; Haufbauer and Schott 1993,1992; Marshall 1993), NAFTA trade negotia-
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Table 1 
Age Structure of the Mexican Population* by Gender: 
1998-2010 
Age 
0-4 
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70-74 
75+ 
Total 
Men 
6,187 
5,988 
5,708 
5,398 
5,020 
4,313 
3,427 
2,779 
2,225 
1,924 
1,545 
1,264 
1,008 
749 
511 
549 
48,624 
1998 
Women 
5,936 
5,757 
5,500 
5,245 
4,949 
4,434 
3,775 
3,153 
2,570 
2,149 
1,712 
1,400 
1,124 
853 
606 
765 
49,929 
Total 
12,123 
11,745 
11,208 
10,643 
9,970 
8,747 
7,202 
5,931 
4,824 
4,073 
3,257 
2,663 
2,132 
1,603 
1,117 
1,313 
98,553 
Men 
6,103 
6,143 
6,132 
5,910 
5,454 
4,985 
4,653 
4,320 
3,522 
2,877 
2,248 
1,881 
1,464 
1,108 
797 
900 
58,498 
2010** 
Women 
5,845 
5,895 
5,894 
5,714 
5,351 
4,995 
4,746 
4,470 
3,896 
3,315 
2,649 
2,199 
1,712 
1,328 
997 
1,325 
60,331 
Total 
11,948 
12,038 
12,025 
11,624 
10,805 
9,980 
9,399 
8,790 
7,418 
6,192 
4,897 
4,080 
3,176 
2,437 
1,794 
2,225 
118,828 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Program Center, 1999. 
^Population in thousands. 
**Estimate. 
tors explicitly discussed rules for trade, labor, and environmental standards while 
they ignored the accompanying increase in labor mobility and flow of undocu-
mented Mexican workers; there are no sanction provisions under NAFTA 
concerning violations of union-related issues such as strike breaking, anti-union 
campaigns, and firing union members—even when complaints are verified 
(Beckman 1997; Hansen-Kuhn 1997; Inter-American Development Bank 1996, 
21). This is the context in which the short-term growth trends of the Mexican 
economy are examined. 
In the 1990s, the rhetorical debate over NAFTA tended to focus on stimulat-
ing macro-economic growth by reducing protectionist barriers to international 
commerce. This view is challenged by Mexico's membership in GATT (now 
World Trade Organization [WTO]) since 1986 and over a century of regional 
economic integration with the United States. Not surprisingly, the multilateral 
mantra of "free trade" has produced only "free-er" trade through selectively 
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imposed quality standards, quotas, and retaliatory tariffs; pre-NAFTA tariffs 
averaged about 5-6 percent on Mexican imports and 12.5-15.0 percent on U.S. 
imports albeit with wide sectoral variation (Peters 1996, 65).5 
In reality, the fundamental issue concerns future patterns of foreign invest-
ment in Mexico6 and how they will influence the economic growth of the Mexican 
economy. That is, by opening the border to "free investment," Mexico has 
become dependent upon the whims of foreign investors to modernize its economy.7 
In the process, Mexican economic planners now confront the daunting task of 
balancing the pursuit of diversified economic development with the reality that 
foreign investors are guided by strategic access to Mexican consumer markets 
and the intra-sectoral integration of continent-wide production and distribution 
systems (Gereffi 1996; Castells and Laserna 1994). The goal of the Mexican 
government is to increase economic linkages across industries (inter-sectoral 
integration) through the use of primary and secondary inputs (e.g., steel, glass, 
electrical components in automobile production) rather than simply offering low 
wage labor and minimal environmental standards for reducing the production 
costs of exports to the United States. Indeed, General Motors' creation of a 
continent-wide auto production system (intra-sectoral integration) conflicts with 
Mexico's goal of diversifying its economy by increasing the use of domestic 
inputs and employment of high value-added labor such as engineers. 
At first glance, traditional economic indicators such as foreign investment, 
balance of trade, and national economic growth (GDP) suggest that the short-term 
achievements of NAFTA have been impressive, albeit with wide vacillations. For 
instance, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) averaged almost $4 billion per year 
before NAFTA (1990-1993) and nearly $10 billion afterwards (1994-1998)— 
peaking at $12 billion in 1997; 60 percent of FDI originates from the United 
States, and it is projected to remain stable at $10 billion in 1999 (American 
Chamber of Commerce 1999). This is mirrored in the rapid escalation of Mexican 
exports, from $51.8 billion in 1993 to $ 110.4 billion in 1997; exports to the United 
States rose from $43.1 billion in 1993 to $94.5 billion in 1997 (CEPAL, 1999, 
International Monetary Fund 1998). Although Mexican exports rose to $117.5 
billion in 1998, increasing imports of foodstuffs and industrial inputs (machinery, 
equipment parts, assembly components) for the maquiladora sector8 led to a 
dramatic overall deficit shift in the Mexican balance of trade—from +$0.62 
billion in 1997 to -$7.7 billion in 1998. Of course, this trade deficit was 
counterbalanced by the huge $15.7 billion surplus with the United States (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1999). During the first six years of NAFTA, the United 
States has accumulated a total trade deficit in goods with Mexico of about -$93 
billion (McMillion 1999). 
Unfortunately for Mexico, the enormous influx of foreign capital did not 
stabilize its fragile domestic banking, investment, and credit systems, which 
intensified pressure on the overvalued peso and national current account bal-
ances; the latter continues to deteriorate today. This resulted in a steep devalua-
tion of the peso, enormous capital flight, debt service difficulties, and a sharp 
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recession that precipitated a crisis of confidence in Mexican political leader-
ship—especially the discredited policies of NAFTA architect President Carlos 
Salinas. The resulting love-hate attitude of Mexicans toward NAFTA has 
corresponded with the roller coaster growth of the economy (GDP) over the last 
decade: 1989-1994 (3.0%), 1994 (3.5%), 1995 (-6.2%), 1996 (5.1%), 1997 
(7.0%), 1998 (4.8%), and 1999 (estimated 3.6%). According to recent projec-
tions, the next millennium will begin with a GDP growth of 3.4 percent, only 
slightly above the pre-NAFTA average (American Chamber of Commerce 
1999). 
Although Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been touted as a measure of 
NAFTA's success, by providing capital for public and private domestic invest-
ment as well as by stimulating job growth through multiplier effects, the 
underlying FDI patterns indicate a more sobering reality—especially in terms of 
lower than expected domestic job growth and higher consumer prices. According 
to the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), 
"the main focus of FDI are related to NAFTA through the establishment of 
continent-wide systems of integrated production [intra-sectoral integration] or 
strategic positioning in the domestic market" (1999, 1). This means that most 
foreign investment is designed to replace portions of higher cost production/ 
distribution systems in the United States (for re-export) and "acquisition of 
private [Mexican-based] assets . . . [in] response to strategic dynamics in 
oligopolistic markets" (CEPAL 1999, 2). Hence, a key feature of intra-sectoral 
integration is the export of high wage industrial jobs from the United States to 
Mexico, where they are replaced with low-wage workers employed in modern, 
capital-intensive production facilities. Not incidentally, the entrance of foreign 
corporations into the Mexican domestic consumer market through FDI has 
provided greater product choice but offered surprisingly modest consumer price 
relief; foreign corporations have taken advantage of traditionally high consumer 
costs in Mexico by matching the prices of inferior domestic products or establish-
ing joint ventures with corporate competitors (Wal-Mart and CIFRA) rather than 
engaging in price-cutting competition. To the chagrin of beleaguered Mexican 
consumers, oligopolistic rather than competitive pricing policies have accompa-
nied the arrival of new, multinational retailing companies.9 
Instead of forging forward (high value-added phases of production such as 
engineering [research & development]) and backward (primary inputs such as 
high quality steel, concrete, electrical components) linkages for promoting 
autonomous Mexican economic development (McMillion 1999; Gereffi 1996; 
Peters 1996) and thus greater domestic job growth, the major beneficiaries have 
been multinational corporations that have invested in a limited spectrum of 
industrial sectors and low value-added phases of production—primarily manu-
facturing. That is, NAFTA has facilitated the continent-wide expansion of their 
international production/distribution systems and has replaced existing domestic 
firms through mergers and acquisitions in order to gain access to previously 
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protected domestic consumer markets—especially food, beverage and tobacco, 
and services such as retailing and banks. 
The strategy of investing in new, modern plants—especially for re-export to 
the United States under HTS 9802 (largely due to competitive pressure from 
Asian competitors)—is illustrated by the following industrial sectors: automotive 
(Chrysler, Ford, GM, VW, Nissan), electronics (Compaq, Daewoo, Sony), and 
apparel (Burlington, Dupont). More recently, a growing share of FDI has 
strategically sought entry into previously restricted Mexican consumer services 
through "acquisition of private assets." These include food (PepsiCo), beverages 
(Anheuser Busch, Labatt, Coca Cola), tobacco (Philip Morris, BAT), as well as 
globalizing services such as telecommunications (Bell Atlantic, Loral, Hughes), 
finance (HSBC, Santander), and retail trade (Wal-Mart). Consequently, corpo-
rate investment patterns have generated significantly fewer jobs and consumer 
price relief than was initially predicted by international economists. 
The most dramatic example of the former investment strategy—intra-
sectoral integration—is demonstrated by U.S.-Mexican auto trade. Indeed, the 
largest sources of FDI in Mexico are the Big Three U.S. automobile manufactur-
ers: General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. As illustrated in Table 2, this commer-
cial flow has accelerated rapidly since the enactment of NAFTA. Between 1993 
and 1998, the value of Mexican auto parts exports nearly doubled ($7.4 to $14.5 
billion) and vehicle exports nearly quadrupled ($3.7 to $13.2 billion) while the 
combined imports of autos and parts from the United States rose only 58.5 percent 
($7.5 to $11.9 billion); in 1998, this trade flow constituted over one-fourth ($27.7 
of $94.5 billion) of total Mexican exports to the United States. Because the vast 
majority of these products are re-exported to the United States rather than sold in 
the domestic economy, they have both inflated the merchandise balance-of-trade 
surplus as well as exacerbated the Mexican current account deficit.10 
Table 2 
Intra-Sectoral Integration: Mexico-U.S. Auto Trade, 
1993-1998 (in millions) 
Years Exports: from Mexico Imports: to Mexico Balance* 
Total Auto-Parts Auto Total Auto-Parts Auto 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
$11,081 
$14,489 
$18,330 
$22,950 
$25,424 
$27,665 
$7,354 
$9,702 
$10,501 
$11,645 
$13,314 
$14,475 
$3,727 
$4,787 
$7,829 
$11,305 
$12,110 
$13,190 
$7,484 
$8,319 
$7,214 
$8,329 
$11,560 
$11,865 
$7,317 
$7,663 
$6,737 
$7,076 
$9,582 
$9,502 
$167 
$656 
$377 
$1,253 
$1,978 
$2,363 
$3,597 
$6,170 
$11,116 
$14,621 
$13,864 
$15,800 
Source'. U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999. 
^Mexican import and export with the United States. 
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For example, the city of Saltillo in the state of Coahuila is called the Detroit 
of Mexico. It boasts two huge auto plants—established by Chrysler and by GM— 
whose production is dedicated solely to North American exports; Chrysler 
invested nearly $500 million dollars in its Dodge Ram and metal stamping plants 
in 1995-1996 (Focus Mexico 1997). Not unexpectedly, Mexican consumer prices 
have not declined in accordance with the sharp fall in the real wages of domestic 
manufacturing workers since 1995. This is mirrored in the bilateral auto trade 
balance, which has increased nearly five-fold in Mexico's favor during this 
period—from $3.6 billion in 1993 to $15.8 billion in 1998 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1999). For these reasons the maquiladora sector is projected to 
account for one-half of all Mexican exports by the end of the year 2000. 
Employment After NAFTA: 
Has Capital Mobility Fueled A Hemispheric Job Machine? 
As previously discussed, current foreign investment strategies that are 
guided by intra-sectoral integration tend to be capital-intensive, produce fewer 
jobs than older plants in the United States, and are not deeply embedded (forward 
or backward linkages) in the Mexican economy. Indeed, as the composition of 
foreign investment in Mexico shifts from labor-intensive "screw-driver" assem-
bly plants to automated, state-of-the-art production facilities, the number of jobs 
created per financial unit of investment has tended to decline. This belies the 
optimistic assumptions of the Binational Study of Migration Between Mexico and 
the United States whose authors assert: 
If Mexico maintains market-driven economic policies, the 
International Monetary Fund [IMF] projects 5 percent annual 
economic growth and 2.5 percent employment growth for 
1997 and thereafter—given this two to one ratio between real 
GDP growth and employment growth, there would be 750,000 
new jobs created each year, based on 30 million employers, 
self-employed workers, and wage and salary employees If 
Mexico is able to generate this additional employment, emi-
gration pressures should diminish. (1997, 30) 
Significantly, these projections are based on fewer than 800,000 new workers 
entering the Mexican workforce each year, a dubious assumption over the next 
two decades. 
So, if official estimates of the growth of the Mexican work force in the next 
century are understated, what are the prospects of NAFTA in improving employ-
ment opportunities in the near future? First, examination of aggregate growth 
trends suggests a moderate impact, albeit with enormous regional variations. Dr. 
Luis Rubio, Director of the Center for Investigation of Development in Mexico 
City, estimates that the number of new jobs directly attributed to NAFTA at about 
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1.5 million over the first five years ( 1994-1998), a powerful job engine but by no 
means turbo-charged (Pfister 1999). Indeed, the nominal GDP growth rate was 
an impressive 7.0 percent in 1997 but IMF job projections fell short by more than 
one-half and, in 1998, net job growth is estimated to have been considerably fewer 
than 400,000 based on GDP gains of 4.8 percent (U.S.-Mexico Chamber of 
Commerce 1999; World Bank 1999). 
The previous PRI-dominated government of Mexico—led by President 
Salinas' handpicked successor, Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000)—vigorously de-
fended the economic achievements of NAFTA. In the process, it complicated the 
enumeration of employment growth by classifying both formal and informal 
employment as unique "jobs." For instance, the Mexican Labor Ministry stated 
that the economy generated 845,000 new jobs in 1998 yet it reported that only 
one-fifth earned more than $5 per day or the equivalent of the minimum wage for 
construction workers in Mexico City (El Financiero 1999). Clearly, many 
workers must perform more than one of these "jobs" simply to earn a sufficient 
income to survive. Furthermore, job gains attributable to FDI obscure employ-
ment losses resulting from the "restructuring" of parastate companies and 
intensifying competition with foreign-manufactured imports as well as industrial 
consolidation following oligopolistic investment strategies (acquisitions, joint-
ventures) of foreign corporations; the number of businesses owned by the 
Mexican government fell from over 1,000 in 1982 to less than 200 in 1999 
(CEPAL 1999; Peters 1996). 
Furthermore, by participating in the world economy, Mexican workers have 
become increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in global market forces as well as 
lower cost labor. For example, El Financiero (1998) a leading Mexican financial 
periodical, reported that manufacturing employment in October 1997 remained 
5.6 percent below 1993 levels as the Mexican economy rebounded from the 
disastrous 1995 recession. This slower than expected job growth is because 
Mexican workers are being displaced by cheaper Asian maquila laborers (Dar-
ling 1993). In addition, it is estimated that 28,000 small- and medium-sized 
Mexican businesses went bankrupt during the first three years of NAFTA because 
of the rising cost and scarcity of commercial credit together with falling internal 
consumer demand (largely due to falling wages) and the influx of cheap imports; 
as many as two million jobs have been estimated to have disappeared during this 
period (Hansen-Kuhn 1997). 
Even the "in-bond" plants or maquiladoras show only moderate employ-
ment gains over the last three years compared to national needs (see Table 3). 
Between 1994 and April 2000, the number of maquiladoras increased from 2,085 
to 3,687 while the number of jobs grew from 582,000 to 1,306,800, or an annual 
average of about 121,000 (Mexico Business Monthly 2000). Significantly, 
without greater inter-sectoral integration, the rise of capital-intensive investment 
has resulted in lower net employment gains as labor-intensive sewing machines 
are being replaced with automated production processes. Hence, the data suggest 
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that the Mexican employment gap—the difference between new workers and net 
job growth—will continue to increase over the next decade even while Mexico 
experiences moderate to high macro-economic growth rates. 
Table 3 
Growth of Mexican Maquiladora Industry 
Number of Plants and Employees 
1993-2000 
Years 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999* 
2000** 
Maquiladora Plants 
2,166 
2,085 
2,104 
2,365 
2,449 
2,952 
3,206 
3,687 
Maquiladora Employees 
540,900 
582,000 
640,000 
729,400 
792,200 
100,030 
112,010 
130,680 
Source: Maquiladora Industry Analysis, 1996; Mexico Business Monthly, 
Maquila Census, 2000. 
*These data were collected in August. 
**These data were collected in April. 
Second, the most disappointing performance of NAFTA is the surprising 
decline in real Mexican wages. This trend was not predicted by proponents of 
NAFTA, who embraced the neoclassical economic explanation of income 
determination. That is, higher "value added" investment (new technology, 
efficient distribution, modern management policies) would yield substantial 
improvements in Mexican labor productivity that, in turn, would lead to higher 
wages. According to this view, rising incomes would increase the standard of 
living of Mexican workers and therefore lead to greater consumer demand— 
including imports from the United States. Although modern, high-technology 
investment has infused the Mexican economy and increased labor productivity 
(especially in manufacturing industries), it has not increased the wages or buying 
power of Mexican workers. The Mexican government acknowledges this prob-
lem and reported that eight million workers earned less than the minimum daily 
wage in 1997—a 20 percent increase from 1993 (Pfister 1999). This trend is 
especially disconcerting when the real earning power of the Mexican minimum 
wage is examined during this period. On August 1,1993, the daily minimum wage 
was the equivalent of $4.62 (U.S. dollars). On August 1,2000, it was only $3.91 
($37.90 pesos)—a 15.4 percent decline even after the rise of the peso—with 
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significant variations by region and occupation (National Minimum Wage 
Commission 2000).11 
This decline in real wages of Mexican manufacturing workers from 1981 to 
1998 is reported in Table 4; wages of maquila or "in-bond" plants (primarily 
within the two-mile Border Industrialization Zone) are presented separately from 
all manufacturing employment. For instance, in 1981 average manufacturing 
hourly wages ($2.82) in Mexico were one-fourth of corresponding wages in the 
United States and nearly double the comparable rate in the maquilas ($ 1.67). Ten 
years later, during the global recession, Mexican manufacturing wages averaged 
$1.58 per hour—only 11 percent of U.S. manufacturing hourly wages. More 
striking, they were only 25.4 percent higher than maquila wages. In 1993, the year 
before the enactment of NAFTA, Mexican manufacturing wages had rebounded 
to an hourly average of $2.40—nearly one-seventh of U.S. wages—while the 
comparable rate in the maquiladoras had climbed to $1.77 per hour. 
Table 4 
Mexican Hourly Compensation in U.S. Dollars 
Manufacturing and Maquiladora: 
1980-1998 
Years Hourly Wage in U.S. Dollars Index to $=100 Exchange Rate* 
Manufacturing * * Maquila * * * 
1980 2.21 n.a. 22 23.0 
7987 2.82 1.67 26 24.5 
1983 1.42 0.91 12 120.1 
1985 1.59 1.07 12 256.9 
1990 1.58 1.26 11 2,813.0 
1993 2.40 1.77 15 3.12 
1994 2.47 1.82 15 3,38 
1995 1.51 1.17 9 6.42 
1997 1.75 1.51 10 7.92 
1998 1.83 1.56 10 9.14 
Source'. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of 
Productivity and Technology, May 1999. 
^Mexican currency converted in 1993 to the New Pesos, which is worth 1,000 
old pesos. 
**Average of all Mexican manufacturing industries. 
***A11 maquiladora data derived from monthly census of all firms registered 
as maquiladoras. 
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Only two years later, 1995, the collapse of the peso drove down all Mexican 
manufacturing wages to a paltry $ 1.51 per hour (nine percent of comparable U.S. 
rates) and maquila manufacturing hourly wages to $ 1.17. Although these hourly 
wage rates rose moderately to $1.75 and $1.51 in 1997, they were 27.1 percent 
and 14.7 percent lower, respectively, than 1993 pre-NAFTA levels and rose only 
marginally in 1998 and 1999. Today, the take-home pay (after benefits) of a 
typical maquila worker employed by a Fortune 500 company is about $5.00 per 
day (Lindquist 2000; Moore 2000). These low wages are especially instructive 
because the manufacturing sector is the major beneficiary of high-tech, foreign 
investment. This trend is especially disconcerting to NAFTA supporters such as 
Philip L. Martin. An agricultural labor economist and specialist in Mexican 
migration, Martin ( 1993) asserted that illegal immigration would begin declining 
substantially after the wage gap between Mexico and the United States fell by 
about one-half, from its pre-NAFTA ratio of 8-to-l to approximately 4-to-l. 
Today, at over 10-to-l, there is little discussion of a major reversal of this wage 
trend in the near future. This is because many U.S. companies are reluctant to 
increase labor compensation in their maquilas and some have even returned to the 
United States because of wage pressures and labor quality concerns. 
For example, in the rapidly growing manufacturing economy of Guadalajara, 
Jalisco, the shortage of labor is partially attributed to the refusal of foreign 
corporations to raise wages; many maquila workers are employed temporarily 
simply to finance a trip to the United States. According to the manager of 
NatSteel, "Guadalajara's high-tech managers are so determined to keep salaries 
from inching up that they meet monthly to make certain [that] everyone is 
maintaining the going rate" (quoted in Lindquist 2000, 1). To make matters 
worse, the lack of discretionary income among the Mexican middle and working 
classes has attenuated the multiplier effect in terms of job growth by stifling the 
expansion of domestic consumer markets. This point is underscored by Salvador 
Placencia, who quit his job sewing Wal-Mart garments in 1999 to work on the 
family dairy, which lies in the outskirts of Guadalajara. "There's lots of jobs 
around now, but they don't pay much." Salvador is waiting for two of five 
brothers working in the United States to come home for a visit and then take him 
back with them because in "[Guadalajara] what you earn in one week doesn ' t even 
buy a pair of shoes" (quoted in Lindquist 2000, 1). As a result, the combination 
of rising expectations and falling wages has reinforced migratory pressures to El 
Norte—especially among more experienced and skilled/educated workers. 
The disappointing record of NAFTA, which is failing to create sufficient 
numbers of jobs at adequate wage levels, is exacerbated by the difficulties arising 
from the continued concentration of investment along the U.S.-Mexican border 
or la Frontera. The ramifications of this issue were clearly understood during the 
NAFTA negotiations. According to President Clinton, during a White House 
meeting with past Chrysler CEO Lee Iacocca on October 20, 1993: 
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If NAFTA passes, you won't have what you have now, which 
is everybody runs up to the Maquiladora line, gets a job in a 
factory and then runs across the line to get a better job. Instead 
there will be more uniform growth in investment across the 
country, and people will be able to work at home with their 
families. And over the period of the next few years, we will 
dramatically reduce pressures on illegal immigration from 
Mexico to the United States. (1993[a], 1) 
This theme was reiterated by President Salinas during an October 1993 television 
interview with David Frost, "Today, Mexicans have to migrate to where jobs are 
being created, the northern part of our country. With NAFTA, employment 
opportunities will move toward where the people live, reducing drastically 
migration, within the country and outside of the country" (quoted in Forero 
1993, 5). 
Capital Mobility or Regional Integration: 
Are Maquiladoras Creating Jobs Or Low-Wage Laborers? 
Unlike the initial promises of NAFTA, the spatial patterns of foreign 
investment in Mexico indicate only modest progress toward regional diversifica-
tion. Today, approximately 75 percent of'Mexico''s maquiladoras and 80 percent 
of maquila workers are located in the border states. The top ten Mexican border 
cities account for 1,751 maquilas (54.7%) and651,580magwz7a workers (59.8%) 
in March of 1999. Although the last five years (1995-1999) have witnessed the 
establishment of more maquiladoras outside the border industrialization zones, 
they tend to be relatively small plants. In 1995, for example, 273 of 465 new 
maquiladora plants (58.8%) were located outside of the border region and were 
distributed among 24 of the 31 Mexican states. These include cities in the interior 
states such as Guanajuato, Guadalajara, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, and San Luis 
Potosi that typically employ fewer than 1,000 workers (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 1999). 
In comparison, the largest maquiladoras are concentrated in the border cities 
of la Frontera such as Nogales, Reynosa, Mexicali, and Nuevo Laredo. In fact, 
the twin-border cities of Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juarez-El Paso alone 
account for 996 (9.2%) of all Mexican in-bond plants and 373,657 (34.3%) of all 
maquiladora workers in 1999! Overall, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(1999) reports that nearly two-thirds (65.8%) of all maquila workers are em-
ployed in only three industrial sectors: electrical, electronic materials and 
accessories (279,988); textiles and apparel (232,745); and automotive equipment 
and accessories (204,531). Clearly, the Mexican government has not been 
successful in guiding the flow of FDI beyond the traditional border industrial 
parks or encouraging its diversification into other industrial sectors. 
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A third key issue of NAFTA concerns the gender distribution and household 
structure of the maquiladora work force. Overall, 70 percent of Mexican maquila 
workers are women, but there are major distributional differences by region: 
border plants have until recently hired almost exclusively women while the 
interior plants—especially auto maquiladoras—employ larger proportions of 
men. The preponderance of female workers in the border maquilas is largely a 
result of the industry policy of maintaining low wages, even below the levels of 
local white- and pink-collar jobs such as retail clerks, secretaries, and waitresses. 
This explains the high labor turnover of border maquilas (much greater than 
interior plants) and the continuous need to recruit teenage girls from southern 
states and, more recently, even older women with greater familial obligations 
(Moore 2000; Tiano 1994; U.S. Office of Technology Assessment 1992). 
Significantly, women's and community groups have been the most successful in 
organizing maquila workers by linking neighborhood and workplace issues such 
as housing, child care, safe drinking water, transportation, sexual harassment, 
health care, and environmental contamination. As labor "shortages" in la Frontera 
lead to the hiring of more older women (late 20s) with fewer paid work options, 
the politics of maquila work could result in greater demands for better wages and 
safer work/living conditions. The demands of a mature workforce, in turn, will 
intensify industry pressure to recruit even younger, more inexperienced female 
workers from interior provinces. 
Not surprisingly, the male partners of female maquila workers frequently 
abandon the undersirable labor market of la Frontera and seek higher paying 
employment in the United States; the relatively low risk of crossing the border 
illegally is rewarded with high U.S. wages—regardless of industrial sector. In 
2000, the Mexican daily minimum wage of less than $4 per day (depending upon 
currency exchange and locality of Mexico) is dwarfed by the U.S. federal 
minimumhourly wage of $5.15 ($5.75 in California). This led Vincente Fox, soon 
after his historic July 2,2000, election to the Mexican presidency, to declare that 
"So long as a worker in Mexico earns $5 per day and a worker in the United States 
earns $60 [per day], immigration problems will continue" (quoted in Lindquist 
2000,1 ). Consequently, these peculiar employment dynamics of la Frontera not 
only contribute to increasing pressure on male household members to become 
undocumented workers in the United States but also to the emergence of 
binational households that are headed by single women in Mexico (Moore 2000; 
Tiano 1994; Chavez 1992). 
A final issue concerns the impact of ejido reform ( 1992 amendment to Article 
27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution) on the modernization of the rural sector, 
which David Yetman has addressed in his article in this issue. This policy of 
encouraging the privatization of communal peasant landholdings was an histori-
cally unprecedented political precursor to the market-based, social and economic 
policies of NAFTA. By reducing tariffs on agricultural products such as corn, 
wheat, vegetables, and dairy products while simultaneously reducing farm 
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subsidy payments, the Mexican government sought to radically reform the 
"inefficiencies" of small-scale farming. The objective of this "revolutionary" 
privatization policy is to facilitate the transfer of small subsistence units to large 
agri-producers and increase the productivity of Mexican agriculture through 
economies of scale, mechanized technologies, and access to scarce sources of 
commercial credit. 
The underlying assumptions of ejido reform are that displaced peasants 
would move to urban areas and become productive industrial workers while 
consuming cheap, imported foodstuffs. This policy would consolidate political 
support from U.S. farmers seeking new agricultural markets while previous ejido 
land would shift to producing cash crops such as sorghum for export markets 
(Snyder and Torres 1998; Gates 1996; Harvey 1996). In the process, the 
government would save billions of dollars in discontinued subsistence food and 
producer price-support subsidies as market forces rather than government inter-
vention would determine the prices of consumer foodstuffs such as tortillas 
(Cornelius and Myhre 1998; Barry 1995; Fox 1994). In the short term, the major 
problem was how to accommodate the enormous waves of displaced peasants, 
with estimates that several million campesinos would have to be resettled during 
the first transitional decade (de Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet 1997; Barry 1995; 
Hinojoso-Ojeda and Robinson 1992). 
The initial concern that the ejido would be swiftly transformed and absorbed 
by commercial agri-business has not transpired. Instead, each ejido has produced 
a wide range of complex responses where the social, political, and economic 
importance of communal lands vary according to their unique socio-historical 
experiences. For instance, some researchers have found that participation in ejido 
organizations generates political capital for mobility into local government 
positions while others depend on the steady, low-risk financial returns for 
retirement. In some situations, ejidos provide community identity and cultural 
attachments for its members while more tenuous patterns are emerging in others 
where aging cohorts of ejidatarios are being succeeded by their children who 
have become established in the United States (Cornelius and Myhre 1998 ; Snyder 
and Torres 1998; de Janvry, Gordillo and Sadoulet 1997). 
Ironically, the Mexican government's policy of destabilizing the ejido 
system has provoked fierce resistance from community members. By increasing 
the cost of living and reducing farm commodity prices, the "rational" response of 
ejidatarios has been to increase "investments" of household resources by allocat-
ing additional family members to employment activities in the United States. 
Indeed, the crisis of the Mexican ejido has increased the dependence of remaining 
household members on remittances sent by family workers in the United States, 
which are generally used for subsistence and consumer products as well as 
sources of rural investment and credit for coping with the economic uncertainty 
of NAFTA-era agricultural policies (Massey 1998; Massey and Espinosa 1997; 
Taylor 1992). This current situation is explained by an ejidatario in the Tlacuitapa 
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region of Jalisco, "Farming here is a very nice thing and it's a good way of life, 
but no way does it make a living The prices seem to go down and down each 
year. . . . If it weren't for my family in California sending money, we wouldn't 
have any choice but to go north to join them" (quoted in Collier 1998). 
Consequently, like earlier peasant struggles over land-tenure relations, the 
contemporary Mexican ejido system is not passively accepting a fundamental 
restructuring without a fight. In the long term, the current campaign to modernize 
the rural sector will spur population growth and reinforce historical patterns of 
legal and illegal labor migration to the United States. The most intriguing 
question is whether ejidatarios without a social tradition of labor migration to El 
Norte will pursue alternative economic strategies via inter-regional migration 
within Mexico or establish new migration streams to the United States. 
Free Trade and Investment: 
Will Capital Mobility Reduce the Flow of 
Mexican Workers to the United States? 
The underlying assumption of the political discourse over NAFTA is that 
free trade can facilitate international capital mobility to Mexico without a 
corresponding increase in the movement of labor to the United States. According 
to this view, the jobs created by the influx of foreign investment would be so 
desirable in terms of wages, benefits, and work conditions that Mexican workers 
would be reluctant to leave their families and migrate to the United States simply 
for higher wages. This logic is articulated by a General Accounting Office report 
that asserts, 
NAFTA does not provide for open borders or the complete 
freedom of movement for labor among participating countries. 
. . . In the long run, illegal Mexican migration to the United 
States should decrease if the Mexican economy can provide the 
jobs needed by an expanding domestic workforce. The imple-
mentation of NAFTA is ultimately expected to accelerate 
Mexico's economic development, thus helping alleviate emi-
gration pressures. (1993, 5) 
As explained previously, this view is based on several faulty premises. First, 
that the wage gap between the United States and Mexico would shrink because 
of increases in Mexican labor compensation. Instead, the initial six years of 
NAFTA have been characterized by economic volatility that has reduced real 
wages and thus reinforced the "rational" behavior of Mexican workers to seek 
employment in the stable labor market of the United States. Second, that 
Mexicans with "good" jobs lack the incentive to maximize their earning ability 
or enhance their standard of living by working in the United States. This perverse 
logic implies that, in a global era of mass marketing and rising consumer 
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expectations, Mexican workers lack the initiative to migrate in order to maximize 
their interests in a capitalist economy while corporations are constantly exploring 
new opportunities to maximize their profits through geographic relocation. 
Finally, that foreign investment would not distort existing social relations of the 
domestic labor market. By hiring almost exclusively women in the border 
maquiladoras in order to depress wages and undermine labor unions (NAFTA 
lacks enforcement powers against illegal, anti-union policies), this employment 
pattern has had a negative impact on traditional household structures. In the 
process, it has led to greater inter-regional migration of women to la Frontera to 
support their families as well as incentives for male household members to seek 
jobs in the United States. 
The most instructive, longitudinal research on this topic has been conducted 
by Douglas S. Massey and his associates (Massey 1998; Massey and Espinosa 
1997; Massey, Alarcon, Durand, Gonzalez 1990). According to Massey, the 
principal factor in the rapid growth of Mexican labor migration to the United 
States is the expansion of market-based economic relations between the two 
countries.l2 That is, out-migration is more likely from Mexican communities with 
high levels of industrialization and other forms of market-influenced economic 
activities. Additionally, this research indicates that labor migration is more 
closely linked to interest rates in Mexico than U.S. wage rates; restricted access 
to and high cost of credit leads Mexicans to seek work in the United States in order 
to accumulate funds both for consumption and investment in their native 
communities. 
Significantly, the most wide spread social movement of the 1990s—the 
Mexican debtors' union or El Barzon—originated among small farmers in 1993 
before gaining support among urban groups throughout the country; strikers have 
focused on the usurious interest rates charged by banks (including credit cards) 
and lack of available credit for small businesses and consumer groups while large 
corporations have received very favorable rates (Torres 1998). This is suggestive. 
The economic volatility of the early-NAFTA regime encourages the growing 
number of Mexicans enmeshed in the expanding market economy to formulate 
their household investment plans based on the stable earnings/saving environ-
ment of the United States. This leads Massey to conclude, "undocumented 
migrants do not come from the poorest and most backward Mexican communi-
ties, but from th[e] most dynamic and rapidly developing. The higher the wages 
in a person's community, and the higher the percentage of women employed in 
local manufacturing, the greater the probability of leaving on a first trip to the 
United States" (1998, 26). 
Clearly, the available data show that the number of Mexicans migrating to 
the United States is climbing sharply—even after the enactment of NAFTA. For 
instance, in the most sophisticated enumeration of the illegal immigrant popula-
tion in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
estimated its size at between 4.6 and 5.4 million in October 1996 (INS 1997).13 
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Overall, the INS reported that over one-half (54%) of all illegals came from 
Mexico (2.5 to 2.9 million) and that the aggregate growth rate of undocumented 
immigrants was 28 percent during the preceding four years (1992-1996). This is 
especially important because illegal entry commonly constitutes the initial phase 
of the lengthy process of obtaining permanent residency. Not surprisingly, 
Mexico accounts for the largest number of legal immigrants. As Table 5 indicates, 
between 1994-1998, more than 643,000 Mexicans legally immigrated to the 
United States and their proportion of the annual total of U.S. legal immigrants is 
rising steadily. 
Table 5 
Legal Immigration from Mexico to the United States: 
1994-1998 
Fiscal Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Mexican Legal Immigration* 
13.8% (111,398) 
12.5% (89,932) 
17.9% (163,572) 
18.9% (146,865) 
19.9% (131,575) 
Total Legal Immigration* 
100.0% (798,394) 
100.0% (720,461) 
100.0% (915,900) 
100.0% (789,378) 
100.0% (660,477) 
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1999. 
*Number of legal immigrants in thousands. 
The expanding volume of Mexican migration to the United States is 
mirrored—albeit imprecisely—by recent trends in U.S. Border Patrol apprehen-
sions. These data are presented in Table 6 by year (1992-1999) and border check-
point. Over the last five years, apprehensions along the southwest border 
increased a moderate 25 percent, from 1.2 to 1.5 million. More striking, however, 
is the dramatic fluctuation in apprehension levels at the different check-points; 
note, some variation is a result of changing Border Patrol deployment strategies. 
This dynamic pattern suggests that Mexican migrants are more quickly reacting 
to Border Patrol enforcement strategies. As a result, there may be lags in devising 
effective deployment responses to this highly mobile population that may lead to 
small short-term and large cumulative underestimates of the volume of illegal 
migrants at the border. 
Although the U.S. immigration enforcement resources are concentrated 
along the Canadian and especially, the Mexican border, which accounts for the 
overwhelming proportion of INS apprehensions, recent research indicates that a 
growing number of illegal immigrants are arriving via other ports of entry. 
indeed, an important implication of the development-migration connection is the 
class composition of contemporary migration flows. According to the INS 
(1997), an estimated 41 percent of the illegal resident population originally 
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Table 6 
Border Patrol Apprehensions*: 
1992-1999 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Del Rio, Texas 
33.4 42.3 50.0 
El Centro, California 
29.9 30.1 27.7 
El Paso, Texas 
248.6 285.8 
Laredo, Texas 
72.4 82.4 
McAllen, Texas 
85.9 109.0 
79.7 
73.1 
124.3 
San Diego, California 
565.6 531.7 450.2 
Tucson, Arizona 
71.0 92.6 
Yuma, Arizona 
24.9 23.6 
South West Border 
1,516.7 1,145.6 
U.S. Total 
1,555.8 1,199.6 
139.5 
21.2 
1,212.9 
1,263.5 
76.5 
37.3 
111.0 
93.3 
169.1 
524.2 
227.5 
20.9 
979.1 
1,031.7 
121.1 
66.9 
145.9 
131.8 
210.6 
483.8 
305.3 
28.3 
1,271.4 
1,324.2 
113.3 
146.2 
124.4 
141.9 
243.7 
283.9 
272.4 
30.2 
1,507.0 
1,549.9 
131.1 
226.7 
125.0 
103.4 
204.3 
248.1 
387.4 
76.2 
1,368.7 
1,411.9 
156.7 
178.3 
87.0 
89.0 
133.5 
146.2 
352.8 
72.4 
1,537.0 
1,225.7 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
September 1999. 
*Number of apprehensions in thousands. These statistics include the appre-
hension of the same individuals more than once. 
entered the country legally at airports and other entry points but then overstayed 
their temporary visas. This new pattern, however, is not reflected in the allocation 
of INS enforcement resources. The Border Patrol received substantial funding 
increases in the 1990s while the U.S. Congress has not authorized sufficient 
personnel for augmenting overburdened INS investigative staffs within the 
continental United States. Even today, U.S. Congressional authorizations extol 
the virtues of "beefing up" the Border Patrol while neglecting the rapid increase 
of illegal overstayers. Again, this is not a trivial issue. Since middle- and upper-
middle-class immigrants are more likely to enter the United States by air 
transportation, contemporary INS enforcement policies essentially regulate the 
low-wage, working class migrants who cross the border by land while neglecting 
the more educated, middle-class immigrants who fail to return to their native 
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countries after the expiration of tourist or student visas. In the case of Mexico, the 
rapid growth of the NAFTA-fueled economy will lead to increasing numbers of 
visa overstayers who will not be accurately reflected in INS apprehension or legal 
immigration statistics. 
Conclusion 
Examination of both short- and long-term demographic and economic trends 
indicate that Mexican migration to the United States will continue to increase 
through at least the next two decades. Although both U.S. and Mexican politicians 
have argued that NAFTA will substantially reduce illegal immigration, the reality 
has so far failed to match the promises of their political rhetoric. NAFTA has not 
generated enough jobs at sufficient wages to significantly deter the ever-
expanding pool of Mexican migrant workers from seeking employment in the 
United States. As Andres Rozenthal, Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico, 
acknowledged in November 1994, the government has not been very interested 
in discouraging Mexicans from searching for work in the United States since "In 
times of economic difficulty, migration has acted as a safety valve for the 
Mexican economy" (cited in Walker 1994). 
Unlike the economic crisis of the early-1980s, which drove hundreds of 
thousands of unemployed Mexicans to search for work in the United States, the 
NAFTA era features relatively sustained rates of growth (except for 1995) and a 
dynamic manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, this period has been characterized 
by higher rather than lower levels of Mexican emigration because of rising 
consumer expectations and falling industrial wages. Furthermore, the tenacity of 
the peasant resistance to the transformation of the ejido system is increasing the 
rural dependence on family members' remittances from the United States. This 
will continue high fertility rates in the rural sector as well as the reliance on 
household members' participation in labor migration networks. 
Overall, the result is a widening gulf between the demographic bulge of new 
workers and the economic reality of modest job growth. For Mexican Senator 
Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, the post-NAFTA responses to this mounting social crisis 
is predictable because "The [Mexican] government's economic policy is depen-
dent on unlimited emigration to the United States" (cited in Collier 1998). And, 
this policy reinforces future out-migration pressures as social inequality increases 
in areas of high emigration due to the departure of the economically successful. 
Furthermore, even those interior states with growing numbers of maquiladoras 
may experience increased emigration in the future. This is because macro-
economic fluctuations may send maquila workers to the United States following 
wage-cuts and employment layoffs. 
The changing patterns of economic development that have been accelerated 
by NAFTA have also produced new flows of Mexican migrant workers. The 
result is a dramatic increase in Mexican immigration to areas without a pre-
existing Mexican population—especially in the states in the Midwest and Deep 
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South. This trend is mirrored in the profusion of journalistic reports of new 
Mexican communities in Colorado, Nebraska, Ohio, New York, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Kentucky, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. From the burgeoning urban 
population of New York City (estimated at over 300,000) to the nascent rural 
communities of Appalachia and Midwestern meat-packing towns, expanding 
networks of Mexican immigrants are seeking their NAFTA dream in unknown 
territories ofEl Norte—even in the shadow of the U.S. capital. And, these are not 
the poorest of the rural poor, as growing numbers of skilled urban workers and 
even college graduates are joining campesinos and maquila veterans in the 
journey to the United States. In the case of Mexico, the economic contradictions 
of neoliberal policies like NAFTA suggest that the promise of trabajo may be 
more likely realized in a Delaware poultry farm than an electronics assembly 
plant in Oaxaca. 
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1. The Mexican architect of NAFTA, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, aggressively 
attacked the historic social and political foundations of capital-labor relationships by attacking urban 
trade unions, reducing publicly subsidized goods and services to the poor, and dramatically altering 
national investment/industrial ownership patterns by permitting foreign ownership of domestic 
companies. According to Ilan Semo, the Salinas Administration "embark[ed] on a neoliberal shock 
policy [in 1991] based on strict compliance with the recommendations of the IMF: fiscal discipline, 
privatization of public enterprises,wage freeze, reduction of the deficit, free trade, and encouragement 
of foreign investment" (1996, 121). In the campo or countryside, this featured the revolutionary 
reform of land tenure relations through the privatization of collectively-owned rural land or ejidos. 
This policy was designed to stimulate investment and thus the rationalization of the farm sector by 
rupturing historic family ties to communal lands (Yetman this issue; Snyder and Torres 1998; 
Cornelius and Myhre 1998; Harvey 1996). Significantly, Salinas was the leading candidate for the 
presidency of the WTO until the late-1994 collapse of the Mexican peso led to his political disgrace 
and self-exile in Dublin. 
2. Government officials of the Clinton and Salinas administrations actively sought to 
politically marginalize U.S. opponents of NAFTA as representatives of relatively small political 
interest groups (labor, environment, human rights) or obstructionists to the new global economic 
order. In addition to the U.S.-Mexican Chamber of Commerce and the World Bank, many politically 
conservative and moderate research centers in Washington, D.C., actively promoted NAFTA and 
criticized its opponents. These include the American Enterprise Institute, Brookings Institution, Cato 
Institute, Heritage Foundation, and the Institute for International Economics. See Karen Hansen-
Kuhn (1997), Thea M. Lee (1995) and William McGaughey (1992). 
3. President Carlos Salinas, officials of his Partido Revolutionary Institucional (PRI) or 
Institutional Revolutionary Party, and Mexican business leaders aggressively mobilized political 
support for NAFTA. They appealed to Mexican nationalism for passage of NAFTA and portrayed 
U.S. opponents as "reactionary forces" seeking to perpetuate Mexico's underdevelopment and 
economic subordination. See Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (1992). 
4. The impact of economic globalization on specific countries depends upon the historically 
negotiated relations between capital and labor. In Japan, for example, it has profoundly altered the 
social relations of capital accumulation by legitimating the rapid pace of labor market reorganization. 
Traditionally, Japanese corporations have accepted a lower rate-of-profit in exchange for labor 
stability by offering permanent employment. Today, labor market reorganization (layoffs, forced 
retirement) has had a devastating impact on many unemployable older workers and their families. For 
an examination of the U.S. industrial restructuring and the attendant processes of labor market 
reorganization have profoundly impacted the political economy of U.S. capital accumulation, see 
Manning (1989, Chapter 5; 2000, Chapter 2). 
5. The sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994, which led to the $52 billion 
multilateral loan "bail-out" package, effectively overwhelmed the proposed 15-year phase-out of 
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Mexican tariffs on imported products. This abruptly increased the cost of Mexican imports paid in 
pesos and dramatically reduced the cost of Mexican exports paid in dollars or other national 
currencies. In essence, the wide vacillation in currency exchange values essentially undercut the 
existing tariff system established by NAFTA (McMillion 1999; Beckman 1997; Peters 1996). 
6. The Foreign Investment Law of Mexico specifies the extent of foreign ownership of 
corporations by industrial sector in Mexico. For example, new petrochemical plants can be wholely-
owned (100%) by foreign corporations, whereas existing state-owned (PEMEX) plants are limited to 
49 percent of foreign participation. For listings of foreign exclusionary and nonexclusionary 
industrial sectors for investment in Mexico, see "Business Opportunities in Mexico" at 
www.mib.org.mx. 
7. For discussions on how Mexico's dependence on foreign investment has increased 
speculator and investor influence on the Mexican economy, see Charles W. McMillion (1999), Karen 
Hansen-Kuhn (1997), Gustavo del Castillo (1996), Enrique Dussel Peters (1996), and Thea M. Lee 
(1995). 
8. The "twin-border" assembly plants or maquiladoras were established through the creation 
of the Border Industrialization Program (BIP) in 1965 following the termination of the Mexican 
contract labor or "Bracero" program (1942-1964). The growing number of unemployed Mexican 
farm workers along the border aroused the concern of the U.S. government. Tariff items 806.30 and 
807.00 were enacted to generate employment opportunities along the border in an attempt to diffuse 
this potentially volatile situation. These tariff codes permit the export of unfinished products from the 
United States, such as electrical parts, and then allow their re-importation as finished goods from 
Mexico tariff free—except for the value added—typically only low-wage assembly costs. Hence, 
maquiladoras connect the tariff free flow of unfinished parts from U.S. plants to their Mexican 
counterparts across the border (for low-wage assembly) and then back as finished products upon their 
re-importation to the United States. This explains the spatial pairing of border cities such as San Diego 
and Tijuana. See Gereffi ( 1996). 
9. The author's field research in Mexico ( 1992-1997) compared consumer prices of the same 
corporate retailer in its stores in the United States and in Mexico City. Consumer prices were generally 
the same in Mexico as in the United States but sometimes considerably higher. One factor for the 
higher retail prices in Mexico is the much greater sales taxes (IVA). Even so, after the devaluation of 
the peso in December 1994 and the erosion of real wages after NAFTA, consumer prices of imported 
goods tend to be much more expensive in pesos than their pre-NAFTA prices. This is reflected in the 
preference of maquila workers along the border to patronize U.S. retailers than shop in Mexican 
stores. See also Gereffi (1996) on the limited growth of domestic production of consumer goods and 
Mexican retailers. 
10. During the first six years of NAFTA, the United States registered total current account 
losses to Mexico of -$118 billion while Mexico's other trading partners enjoyed a current account 
surplus of $190 billion (McMillion 1999). This seeming contradiction of greater trade exports and 
greater outflow of capital from Mexico reflects unfavorable internal pricing and profit repatriation of 
multinational corporations in Mexico as well as unfavorable currency exchange that has dramatically 
increased the cost of capital equipment purchases (e.g., auto manufacturing plants)—especially from 
Japan and Southeast Asia. This underscores the vulnerability of the Mexican neoliberal economic 
model due to limited industrial integration (Gereffi 1996). It also illuminates the important role of the 
international narcotics trade in stabilizing the Mexican economic system by augmenting its deterio-
rating current account balance through the circulation and investment of its billions of dollars of 
profits. 
11. The National Minimum Wage Commission of Mexico raised the minimum wage effective 
December 3,1998. For example, zone A, which includes Mexico City, was set at $34.45 pesos (U.S. 
$3.44) while zone C, which includes the rural state of Michoacan (the major source of emigration to 
U.S.) was set at $29.7 pesos (US $2.97). The National Minimum Wage Commission of Mexico raised 
the minimum wage effective January 1,2000. For example, zone A which includes Mexico City, was 
set at $37.90 pesos (U.S. $3.91) while zone C which includes the rural state of Michoacan (major 
source of emigration to U.S.) was set at $32.7 pesos (U.S. $3.37). 
12. Massey reports that the absolute number of Mexicans migrating to the United States has 
escalated sharply over the last two decades. He contends that the circular pattern of Mexican labor 
migration is responsible for the relatively small proportion of permanent settlers, although it has been 
increasing in the 1990s. Massey's extensive research and publications on this topic are summarized 
at www.pop.upenn.edu/mexmig. 
13. This figure does not include the children of undocumented immigrants who were born in 
the United States. 
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